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AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP1. Introduction
There is a growing concern that the spill
over from the financial crisis in developed
markets and the resulting economic slow-
down will threaten Africa’s potential
“Growth Take-off”. A key challenge for the
international community is to design and
implement an appropriate regulatory fra-
mework which would manage risks, guard
against excessive risk taking, while allo-
wing financial institutions to innovate and
support the real sector. An equally daun-
ting challenge is to ensure that the regula-
tion and governance of the international
financial system and key global institu-
tions are responsive to the needs and
specific circumstances of developing
countries. This will require more effective
participation of developing countries in
key decision-making processes in global
institutional and governance bodies.
African countries have felt particularly
disadvantaged, often excluded from inter-
national negotiations and decision-making
on issues which have a significant impact
on Africa’s development prospects. The
current financial and economic crisis pro-
vides an important opportunity to advance
the objectives embedded in the Monterrey
Consensus(1), to re-engage and revitalize
Africa’s voice and representation in the
regulation of the international financial
system, and to ensure that Africa’s inter-
ests are taken into account when deci-
sions are made.
The African Ministerial Conference of 12
November 2008 on the financial crisis
highlighted the need for a comprehensive
governance reform of the global financial
system and the Bretton Woods Institutions
(BWIs). The Conference, in particular,
emphasized the need to adequately reflect
the changing global economic realities and
emerging challenges, with special empha-
sis on greater voice and representation for
emerging and developing economies. The
Declaration of the G-20 Summit on
Financial Markets and the Global
Economy during the same month also
underscored the need for reform.
In the same Declaration, the Financial
Stability Forum (FSF) was also called
upon to urgently expand and broaden its
membership of emerging economies.
Other major standard-setting bodies (e.g.
the Basel Committee) were also reques-
ted to promptly review their membership
to ensure adequate voice and participa-
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(1)The Monterrey Consensus emphasizes the following: “We stress the need to broaden and strengthen the
participation of developing countries and countries with economies in transition in international economic deci-
sion-making and norm-setting.” (Paragraph 62). “A first priority is to find pragmatic and innovative ways to fur-
ther enhance the effective participation of developing countries and countries with economies in transition in
international dialogues and decision-making processes.”(including participation in the decision making in the
Bretton Woods Institutions) (Paragraph 63).tion of developing nations. Acknowledging
its central role in this process, the IMF
was called upon to collaborate with the
expanded FSF and other bodies, and
work to better identify vulnerabilities, anti-
cipate potential stresses, and act swiftly
for effective crisis response.
The G20 has now established a number
of Working Groups to report back to the
meeting of G20 Leaders to be held in
April. Working Group 4, to be co-chaired
by France and Indonesia, will conduct a
review of the mandates, governance and
resource requirements of the World Bank
and other Multilateral Development Banks
in light of recent financial and economic
events.
Working Group 3 to be co-chaired by
South Africa and Australia will focus on
IMF reform: reviewing its mandate,
resources, and considering how to streng-
then its governance, legitimacy and
accountability.
2. Regulation and governance
of the global financial system:
New realities call for new
principles
It is evident now that the new realities of
the global economy call for a revision of
the principles that form the foundation of
the governance of the global financial
architecture and the mandates of global
financial institutions, especially the
Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) which
were established more than sixty years
ago in very different circumstances. There
is also a general consensus on the reexa-
mination of the role of stakeholders and
their interaction at the national, regional,
and global levels. The ultimate goal is to
establish mechanisms to increase global
financial stability and harness global
financial resources to meet the develop-
ment needs of the poor.
The first argument for reexamining the
principles of governance of the global sys-
tem from a developing country (hence
African) perspective is based on the
mounting evidence that financial innova-
tions and integration have dramatically
made it more difficult to insulate national
economies from shocks originating from
beyond their borders(2). On the one
hand, financial shocks have dramatic real
sector effects. On the other hand, globali-
zation and financial development as well
as integration have increasingly reduced
the power of conventional macroeconomic
policy tools in response to shocks. As a
result, countries are less equipped to deal
with the direct and indirect effects of
2
2In recent years, financial market activity has outpaced the real sector in growth dramatically. The ratio of forei-
gn assets and liabilities to GDP has more than tripled in industrialized countries and more than doubled in
emerging and developing countries over the past 25 years.external financial shocks. New strategies
are therefore needed, and better coordi-
nation is required, at the global level to
achieve global financial stability.
The second argument which has been
advanced is that the costs of failure of the
financial system are socialized not only at
the national level, but also globally, as
evidenced by the current financial and
economic crisis. Indeed, national borders
have become porous, making economies
more vulnerable to external shocks. The
impact of shocks is likely to be relatively
larger for developing countries given that
they are less equipped in terms of finan-
cial resources and regulatory capacity to
undertake required emergency responses
to major shocks. Certainly, African coun-
tries are not able to mobilize the
resources needed to orchestrate major
bailouts of financial institutions as has
been observed in the United States and
Europe. Measures to prevent major dis-
ruptions of the financial system globally
and in developed countries are therefore
of great interest for developing countries,
including those in Africa.
Africa’s needs are country-specific and
they evolve with changing global circum-
stances, which create new challenges for
the continent over time. These new reali-
ties call for a review of the principles that
are at the foundation of global decision-
making processes, and, more specifically,
governance and representation in the glo-
bal financial system and institutions.
Governance and Mandates
The G20 will consider ways of strengthe-
ning MDB governance, political accounta-
bility and effectiveness. Particular atten-
tion has been focussed on the composi-
tion and voting structure in the World
Bank and the IMF Boards, and the call for
greater representation from emerging and
developing countries. The G20 discus-
sions will feed into the Spring and Annual
meetings of the IMF, World Bank and
AfDB. African Ministers and Governors
will want to ensure that their views are
taken into account.
Voting power of countries participating in
the global system and financial institu-
tions, in particular, in the Bretton Woods
Institutions, is determined on the basis
that members’ shareholding should reflect
their relative positions in the world econo-
my. Basic votes were added on the basis
of the principle of equality of states as a
way of protecting the interests of smaller
countries during decision-making.
Developed countries therefore enjoy a
significant majority of voting power, while
developing countries have witnessed a
decline in their voting power in decision-
making processes.
The second feature of the current frame-
work is that many of the major policy deci-
3sions are taken by the executive boards
of the BWI where developing countries
are under-represented in terms of mem-
bership. For instance, forty seven sub-
Saharan African countries are represen-
ted at the boards of the IMF and the
World Bank by two executive directors.
These directors have relatively, large
constituencies, making it difficult to ensu-
re that the diverse interests of African
countries are adequately represented in
informal processes that influence final
decisions.
These principles may no longer be appro-
priate as the costs of inadequate regula-
tion of the global system impact on all
countries, as witnessed by the current cri-
sis. To that end, the G-24 has called for
an urgent need to achieve parity between
developed and developing countries in
the BWI voting structures and to give a
greater voice to the poorest countries
without diluting the relative voting power
of any developing country.
To address these weaknesses, there is a
need to broaden partnerships in debates
over the reform process and to achieve a
healthy balance between multilateralism
and bilateralism. Enhancing the voice
and representation of developing coun-
tries would improve the legitimacy and
credibility of all international institutions,
including the BWI. More importantly, it
would assist in enhancing ownership of
programs which is critical to achieving
development effectiveness and quality
results. Debates on voice and represen-
tation have taken place in both the IMF
and the World Bank in recent years.
IMF
The 2006 IMF Annual Meeting endorsed a
programme of governance reform to “bet-
ter reflect the relative weight of member
countries in the world economy and
enhance the voice and participation of
low-income members within the institu-
tion”.
Members agreed on a package of reforms
which included the following steps: a) an
initial ad hoc increase in quotas for the
‘most under-represented countries’ –
China, Korea, Mexico and Turkey; b) a
new quota formula to guide the assess-
ment of the adequacy of members’ quotas
in the IMF; c) a second ad hoc quota
increase based on the new formula; d) an
increase in basic votes, which effectively
increases the voting power of those mem-
bers whose voting power is below the
Fund membership average as a whole,
such as low income countries; and finally
e) additional staff resources for the two
Executive Directors representing African
members.
The initial ad hoc quota increase for
China, Korea, Mexico and Turkey has
4already been implemented and the
Executive Board is in the process of
developing a new quota formula. The ele-
ment on basic votes requires an amend-
ment to the Articles of Agreement – a
relatively rare occurrence which requires
the majority support of the membership.
In April 2008, the Board of Governors
adopted a Resolution on quota and voice
reforms, subsequently welcomed by the
International Monetary Fund and the
Financial Committee of the Board of
Governors (IMFC) at the Annual Meeting.
The IMFC stressed that it is was an
important first step toward a realignment
of members’ quota and voting shares.
The final stage for increased basic votes
to become effective requires acceptance
by at least three-fifths of the members,
representing eighty-five percent of total
voting power.
World Bank
Issues of voice and representation in the
World Bank have also been the subject of
debate for some years. In April 2008, the
Development Committee concluded that:
“We welcomed the Managing Director’s
report on the reform of IMF quota and
voice. We encouraged the Bank to advan-
ce work on all aspects of voice and parti-
cipation, keeping in mind the distinct natu-
re of the Bank’s development mandate,
and the importance of enhancing voice
and participation for all developing and
transition countries in the WBG. We look
forward to a process that is inclusive and
consultative among shareholders, and to
receiving concrete options from the
Bank's Board by our next meeting with a
view to reaching consensus on a compre-
hensive package by the 2009 Spring mee-
ting.”
Discussions have continued and are
reflected in the Development Committee
communiqué issued after the World Bank
Annual Meeting in October 2008. This
noted that the package of reforms enhan-
cing voice and participation of all develo-
ping and transition countries (DTCs) in
WBG governance and work, brought for-
ward by the Bank’s Board, addressed
many aspects of voice and participation in
light of the Monterrey Consensus. This
was seen as an important first step in the
ongoing process of comprehensive
reform.
This package includes both concrete
immediate steps and commitments to fur-
ther work. An additional Board seat for
Sub Saharan Africa on the Bank’s Board
will be created. DTC voting shares in
IBRD and IDA will increase, giving special
emphasis to smaller members. Further
realignment of Bank shareholding will be
taken up by the Bank’s Board in an impor-
tant shareholding review that will develop
principles, criteria and proposals for Bank
5shareholding. The review will consider the
evolving weight of all members in the
world economy and other Bank specific
criteria consistent with the Bank’s deve-
lopment mandate, moving over time
towards equitable voting power between
developed and developing members.
The Board will develop proposals by the
2010 Spring Meeting and no later than the
2010 Annual Meetings, with a view to rea-
ching consensus on realignment at the
following meeting. There is considerable
agreement on the importance of a selec-
tion process for the President of the Bank
that is merit-based and transparent, with
nominations open to all Board members
and transparent Board consideration of all
candidates. In addition, Bank
Management has committed to continue
enhancing diversity of management and
staff and decentralizing decision-making.
The Development Committee asked for
periodic reports on progress and future
proposals for a subsequent realignment of
Bank shareholding as part of comprehen-
sive reform.
Collaboration
The question of co-operation between the
IMF and the World Bank has also recei-
ved attention over the years. Most recent-
ly, the Malan Review Committee report in
February 2007, stressed that the increa-
sed integration of economies and the
emergence of many global issues,
requires international institutions not only
to respond to developments, but to be
“ahead of the curve” and remain innovati-
ve and proactive in helping members
address the challenges of globalisation.
The report illustrated examples of good
collaboration, such as the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries initiative and the
Financial Sector Assessment Program,
emphasised that poor collaboration
results in costs to donors and partners
through wasted resources, poor and
conflicting advice, and gaps in provision.
Subsequently, a Joint Management Action
Plan (JMAP) was prepared in September
2007 covering areas such as technical co-
operation and procedural changes; staff
exchanges; the joint design and imple-
mentation of facilities and instruments;
and collaboration on a Bank-Fund
approach to fiscal policy design. The
Malan report made a number of other
recommendations for changes in Board
composition and interaction. The first pro-
gress report is anticipated before the
2009 Annual Meetings of the IMF and
World Bank boards.
The African Development Bank
The role of the AfDB was considered
recently by a High Level Panel co-chaired
by President Chissano and Prime Minister
6Paul Martin. They reported to the AfDB
President in January 2008. Their findings
are very relevant to the current debate.
In brief, the HLP concluded that to reduce
poverty, Africa needs sustained and sha-
red growth, driven by the private sector,
with a more equal distribution of opportu-
nities. Without integration, the continent
will remain disjointed, with many small,
shallow markets that are uncompetitive on
their own and unattractive to investors.
Underpinning this integration are capable
states, offering good and accountable
governance. Progress, or the lack of it,
will be closely related to success in rebuil-
ding post-conflict states and managing
fragile situations.
There is no single development model to
apply. Uneven progress has made Africa
more diverse, not less. Africa will need
strong, committed leadership and appro-
priate continental institutions. The African
Union is providing a political lead, but the
continent needs an economic motor to
facilitate implementation on the ground, to
drive economic integration. The HLP
recommended that the ADB should beco-
me that motor, as the premier develop-
ment institution in Africa. It must be a
voice for development in Africa and for
Africa internationally.
The panel saw the Bank as an institution
that can reduce poverty and foster deve-
lopment through growth and economic
integration. It underscored that it had the
right credentials: an elected African presi-
dent, universal African membership, an
exclusive focus on African development,
and a strong presence on the continent,
including its headquarters and growing
network of country offices. It can also
address the full range of Africa’s chal-
lenges by supporting public and private
initiatives across the continent.
The panel members recommended that
the AfDB should now concentrate its
resources and efforts on four interlocking
flagship areas of focus, all essential for
growth and economic integration: inves-
ting in infrastructure, building capable
states, promoting the private sector, and
developing skills. The AfDB should posi-
tion itself to support African countries in
managing and coordinating assistance, in
accordance with their own priorities.
They believed that if the Bank had to
become Africa’s premier development ins-
titution, it must grow. Compared with simi-
lar institutions and, indeed, some bilateral
donors, it is significantly understaffed and
stretched too thin. Shareholder commit-
ment to a cogent longer term vision for
the Bank will be critical. Management and
shareholders should develop a medium-
term strategic accord that provides addi-
tional resources linked to specific delive-
rables and to performance.
7Management presented a response to
shareholders at the 2008 Annual Meeting
in Maputo, Mozambique, and a medium
term strategy has been developed accor-
dingly.
Voice at Other Standard Setting Bodies
Like in the case of BWIs reforms, further
attention should be given to building criti-
cal alliances and strategic networks and
partnerships to advance the continent’s
development interests in international
standard setting bodies such as the Basle
II Committee, the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS), the Financial Stability
Forum (FSF). The Monterrey Consensus
explicitly called on these three bodies “to
continue enhancing their outreach and
consultation efforts with developing coun-
tries … and to review their membership,
as appropriate, to allow for adequate par-
ticipation.” (Paragraph 63) It is clear that
very little progress has been made since
the Monterrey Consensus in 2002,
making it imperative for African countries
to strengthen their participation in existing
non-governmental bodies such as the
G24. Furthermore, there is a need for
Africa to forge bilateral strategic alliances
with other key developing countries in
South Asia (e.g. India) and Latin America
(e.g. Brazil and Argentina) on these
issues.
Resources
The share of multilateral aid has stayed
relatively consistent for the last twenty
years at between 27% and 32%, but has
grown in complexity and with increased
fragmentation. Some 263 international
organisations are now eligible to receive
ODA, up from 47 agencies in 1960 and
140 in 1980. This imposes additional tran-
saction costs, as well as a heavy burden
on those partners with weak capacity.
In 2008, multilateral aid accounted for
only one quarter ($28bn) of total develop-
ment aid ($117bn). A further $11bn is
channeled through multilateral organiza-
tions in the form of grants or earmarked
trust funds. The three largest multilateral
organisations are the European
Commission (EC), the World Bank and
the United Nations system, accounting for
36%, 24% and 20% of core contributions
respectively. The multilaterals allocate
more of their resources (40%), compared
to 25% from bilaterals.
Although individual DAC donors vary
widely in the proportion of aid channelled
through the multilateral system (only a
few such as Germany have a formal cap
on the amount, there is broad consensus
among them on the advantages). These
are seen as: economies of scale; global
reach and providing public goods; stan-
dard setting; political neutrality and legiti-
8macy; combining capital and know how;
lower transaction costs and potentially
more effective.
According to OECD, DAC donors value
their contributions to multilateral organisa-
tions given that they cover poverty reduc-
tion; fragile states; HIV/AIDS; food securi-
ty; climate change and the environment;
gender equality; and education. For ins-
tance, multilateral agencies represent the
majority of aid to fragile states, especially
in Africa.
However there has been demand for clo-
ser co-operation between multilateral
organizations and concerns over duplica-
tion of effort. Many DAC donors are, the-
refore, developing a stronger strategic
and more focused multilateral approach.
They have accepted the need for more
collective action in monitoring and asses-
sing the performance of multilateral orga-
nisations; better understanding of the
duplications and gaps, as well as compa-
rative advantages, in the multilateral sys-
tem; and the need for greater system-
wide coherence.
In the Paris Declaration, donors under-
took to increase the effectiveness of
development assistance, and to improve
the alignment with country priorities. The
follow-up Accra Agenda for Action last
year, commits donors and developing
countries to “complete good practice prin-
ciples on country-led division of labour”
and to “start dialogue on international divi-
sion of labour across countries by June
2009”.
It is clear that with demands globally for
additional resources to be made available
to deal with the impact of the crisis, tradi-
tional and new donors will face choices
not just on the amount of resources, pur-
pose, terms and conditions, but also
through what channels this should be pro-
vided. In making decisions, relative effi-
ciency (defined by DAC as “the extent to
which a development intervention has
attained, or is expected to attain, its rele-
vant objectives efficiently and in a sustai-
nable way”) and comparative advantage
will be important, but so will the views
from recipient partner countries.
Response to the Crisis
The G20 will be assessing MDB res-
ponses to the current crisis. As the IMF
and World Bank are represented on the
G20 Working Groups, this note provides
background information on the AfDB res-
ponse. The AfDB proposes to provide
increased support through: ADF; an
Emergency Liquidity Facility; and a trade
finance initiative. It will also speed up
decision-making and implementation.
ADF
The aim is to accelerate resource trans-
fers to ADF countries, targeting countries
9and sectors where the needs are grea-
test. The AfDB will review pipelines and
restructure portfolios so as to release
resources for early commitment and
through fast disbursing instruments. It will
seek supplementary resources, in the
short term through co-financing from
development partners for specific project
investments, including multinational
investments in infrastructure and critical
public-private projects that otherwise
would not continue. The AfDB will also
consider a catalytic Trust Fund for ADF
countries to provide assistance to those
countries that are high performers, have
demonstrated sustained commitment to
decisive reforms and may, in light of the
impact of the crisis, require additional
financing to deliver strong results.
Emergency Liquidity Facility (ELF)
One of the biggest impacts of the current
crisis is the significant liquidity crunch that
is affecting the ability of countries and
financial institutions to implement or pur-
sue their development and commercial
activities. The Bank proposes to establish
an Emergency Liquidity Facility (ELF),
tentatively set at USD 1.5 billion, but sub-
ject to a review on the basis of actual
demand. The ELF is expected to provide
eligible beneficiaries with the means to
meet urgent liquidity needs, within a fast
turnaround time and with appropriately
designed conditionalities.
The ELF will function as a revolving facili-
ty, disbursed in USD or Euro. It will opera-
te on the basis of “first come, first served”
with an initial cap of USD 150 million per
country (subject to review), consisting of
sovereign guaranteed or possibly non-
sovereign guaranteed transactions.
The ELF will be available to a broad
range of eligible beneficiaries, including
Central Banks, for on-lending to public
and private financial institutions, public
and private financial institutions with pro-
ven market access before the crisis, and
a large presence in domestic and regional
economies. The proposed use of funds
under the ELF would be relatively broad
and could cover, debt service obligations,
borrowers’ requests for disbursement in
case of FI or payments that are critical
and/or take advantage of new develop-
mental business opportunities. The facility
is intended to operate as a “last resort”
type of facility. Its use should be limited to
exceptional circumstances and not as a
substitute to normal funding sources.
Trade Finance Initiative
The global financial crisis has crippled
many international banks that are invol-
ved in financing trade as confirming
banks. Higher credit rating thresholds and
sharply reduced credit limits are now
applicable for African banks that facilitate
the import and export of goods. This is
having a detrimental effect and is restric-
10ting credit and threatening Africa’s vital
trade flows. As a direct and immediate
response to this situation, the Bank
intends to announce its intention to sup-
port trade finance through a new USD 1
billion trade finance initiative (TFI).
The initiative could include Trade Finance
in Approved Letters of Credit to Banks,
under new Lines of Credit for Trade
Finance, including through Development
Finance Institutions and other Trade
Organizations.
These responses would, of course, requi-
re additional resources. The AfDB’s
assessment is that such increased len-
ding would bring the Bank to its agreed
prudential limits. Although the Bank cur-
rently has significant unused risk capital
(50%), it needs additional risk-bearing
capacity in the future to sustain additional
risks, in order to further increase lending,
particularly to adequately respond to this
crisis and to continue to sustain net inco-
me transfers to development initiatives.
The projected financial position indicates
that in order for the Bank to fulfil its deve-
lopment mandate while remaining a finan-
cially strong institution, a strategy for futu-
re capital increases should be considered.
A capital increase would therefore beco-
me necessary to provide the Bank with
the capacity to respond appropriately to
the financial and economic crisis
.
3. Way Forward
The Ministerial Conference in Tunis was a
necessary initiative designed to build a
framework for African countries to debate
at higher levels and generate harmonized
positions on voice issues that can be
taken to forums such as the G20. Such
discussions should also be broadened to
facilitate the exchange of ideas in areas
such as sharing experience in the imple-
mentation of Basel II, trade policy issues
in the WTO, discussions in forums where
some African countries participate as
observers (e.g., OECD) or as invited
guests (e.g., G8).
The development partners support will be
critical in providing technical assistance to
African countries, to strengthen their
voice, representation and effective partici-
pation at BWIs and other standard setting
bodies. Ministers and Governors will
want to consider key priorities for the
continent, taking into account, the range
of forums, the sequencing of meetings,
and develop a strategy to influence dis-
cussions.
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